We address two related unanswered questions in maximum revenue multi-item auctions. Is dominantstrategy implementation equivalent to the semantically less stringent Bayesian one (as in the case of Myerson's 1-item auction)? Can one nd explicit solutions for non-trivial families of multi-item auctions (as in the 1-item case)? In this paper, we present such natural families whose explicit solutions exhibit a revenue gap between the two implementations. More precisely, consider the k-item n-buyer maximum revenue auction where k, n > 1 with additive valuation in the independent se ing (i.e., the buyers i have independent private distributions F i j on items j). We derive exact formulas for the maximum revenue when k = 2 and F i j are any IID distributions on support of size 2, for both the dominant-strategy (DIC) and the Bayesian (BIC) implementations. e formulas lead to the simple characterization that, the two models have identical maximum revenue if and only if selling-separately is optimal for the distribution. Our results also give the rst demonstration, in this se ing, of revenue gaps between the two models. For instance, if k = n = 2 and Pr {X F = 1} = Pr {X F = 2} = 1 2 , then the maximum revenue in the Bayesian implementation exceeds that in the dominant-strategy by exactly 2%; the same gap exists for the continuous uniform distribution X F over [a, a + 1] ∪ [2a, 2a + 1] for all large a.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the k-item n-buyer maximum revenue auction with additive 1 valuation in the independent se ing (i.e., the buyers i have independent private distributions F j i over the range [0, ∞) on items j). How should the optimal mechanisms be designed?
Myersons's classical paper [24] elegantly solved the problem for the single item case. For multiple items (k > 1), the problem is much more complex with an extensive literature (see Related Work below). Much progress has been made, but many interesting questions remain open. In this paper we focus on two such questions that arise naturally.
Firstly, there are two standard models of mechanism design for auctions, known respectively as dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC) and Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanisms. Formally, the BIC constraints look much weaker than the DIC constraints. It is thus a remarkable feature of Myersons's theory that exactly the same maximum revenue is achieved by the BIC mechanisms and the DIC mechanisms for single-item auctions. Can this equivalence hold for k > 1?
Q1. For k > 1, can Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanisms ever produce strictly more revenue than the dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC) mechanisms?
(A substantial literature exists on the above DIC versus BIC question: see Related Work below). For our second question, note that Myerson's characterization of optimal mechanisms for k = 1 leads to explicit formulas for the maximum revenue. For k > 1, in the single buyer (n = 1) case, there is a rich collection of sophisticated results (e.g., [14-19, 23, 25, 28] ), where explicit expressions for optimal revenue are obtained for certain discrete and continuous distributions. However, for k > 1 and n > 1, there do not seem to be any interesting results of this kind in the literature. us we pose the following question:
Q2. For k > 1 and n > 1, can we obtain explicit expressions of the optimal revenue for interesting families of distributions?
In this paper we address questions Q1 and Q2. In the direction of Q2, we derive exact formulas for the maximum revenue for both DIC and BIC implementations for k = 2 and any n > 1, where the 2n distributions F j i are IID with a common F of support size 2. As a by-product, these formulas give an answer to Q1, showing the BIC optimal revenue expression to be strictly greater than that of DIC for a broad range of parameters. In fact the formulas lead to the simple characterization that, the two implementations have identical maximum revenue if and only if selling-separately is optimal for the distribution. For instance, if k = n = 2 and Pr {X F = 1} = Pr {X F = 2} = 1 2 , then the maximum revenue in the Bayesian implementation exceeds that in the dominant-strategy by exactly 2%. A natural extension to the continuous case shows that the same 2% gap holds for the uniform distribution over [a, a + 1] ∪ [2a, 2a + 1] as a → ∞. We also remark that our result complements a theorem in [30] that the BIC maximum revenue is always upper bounded by a constant factor of the DIC maximum revenue.
Beyond providing an answer to Q1 and Q2, our techniques may have several other contributions. Firstly, it is demonstrated in a natural context how to turn a DIC mechanism into a BIC mechanism with increased revenue (see a speci c example in Section 3.3). Secondly, our proposed optimal mechanisms, while applicable to arbitrary n buyers, have simple descriptions. Each mechanism employs only a pure hierarchical allocation rule. Such simple designs may lend these mechanisms to other applications. Finally, the problem of nding explicit exact solutions to multi-item auctions is an interesting open area. Economic concepts and interpretations o en value precision over constant approximations. A collection of exactly solvable auction problems could be valuable for other econometrics explorations.
e main results of this paper will be stated in Section 3 with proofs given in Sections 4 and 5. Formal descriptions of our mechanisms and formulas will be illustrated through concrete examples (see Example 1 in Section 3.1 and 3.3) to help the understanding.
Related Work
Regarding Q1, when the independence condition on the distributions F j i is dropped, then the answer is known. [9] showed BIC can generate unbounded more revenue than DIC, when F j i are correlated across buyers even for k = 1. Recently, [29] showed in some instance with k > 1, BIC can generate strictly more revenue than DIC, when F j i are correlated across items. ere are other examples (e.g. [13, 23] ) where DIC and BIC are shown to be inequivalent in revenue (and other a ributes), but their models are farther away from our model under consideration here.
We note that much progress has been made on the computational aspects of multi-item auctions. e intrinsic complexity of computing the optimal revenue has been investigated (e.g. [8, 10] ; e cient algorithms have been found in a variety of circumstances (e.g. [4, 5, 11] ); furthermore, simple approximation mechanisms have been extensively studied in various environments (e.g. [1, 6, 7, 12, 18, 21, 22, 26, 27, 30] Let F be a multi-dimensional distribution on [0, ∞) nk . Consider the k-item n-buyer auction problem where the valuation n × k matrix t = (t j i ) is drawn from F . Each buyer i has t i ≡ (t 1 i , t 2 i , · · · , t k i ) as his valuations of the k items. We also refer to t i as buyer i's type, and t as the type pro le of the buyers (or pro le for short). For convenience, let t −i denote the valuations of all buyers except buyer i; that is, t −i = (t i | i i). Note that t j , the j-th column of the matrix t, contains the valuations of all the buyers on item j.
A mechanism M speci es an allocation q(t) = (q j i (t)) ∈ [0, ∞) nk , where q j i (t) denotes the probability that item j is allocated to buyer i when t = (t j i ) is reported as the type pro le to M by the buyers. We require that n i=1 q j i (t) ≤ 1 for all j, so that the total probability of allocating item j is at most 1. M also speci es a payment s i (t) ∈ (−∞, ∞) for buyer i.
e utility u i (t) for buyer i is de ned to be t i · q i (t) − s i (t), where t i · q i (t) stands for the inner product
the utility buyer i would obtain if he has type t i but reports to the seller as t i . e expected allocationq i (t i ) for buyer i is de ned to be E t −i (q(t i , t −i )). e expected utilityū i (t i ) for buyer i is de ned to be
e following formulas are well known:
Two kinds of mechanisms have been widely studied, referred to as Dominant-strategy and Bayesian implementations as speci ed below. Dominant-strategy: IR conditions: u i (t) ≥ 0 for all i and t.
DIC conditions:
A mechanism is called individually rational (IR)/dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC), if it satis es the IR conditions/the DIC conditions, respectively. Bayesian: BIR conditions:ū i (t i ) ≥ 0 for all i and t i .
BIC conditions:
A mechanism is called Bayesian individually rational (BIR)/Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), if it satis es the BIR conditions/the BIC conditions, respectively.
be the total payments received by the seller. For any mechanism M on F , let M(F ) = E x ∼F (s(x)) be the (expected) revenue received by the seller from all buyers. e optimal revenue is de ned as REV D (F ) = sup M M(F ) when M ranges over all the IR-DIC mechanisms. Similarly, in the Bayesian model, the optimal revenue is de ned as REV B (F ) = sup M M(F ) where M ranges over all the BIR-BIC mechanisms. As a benchmark for comparison, let SREV (F ) stand for the revenue yielded when each item is sold separately by using the optimal mechanism of [24] .
Hierarchy Allocation
e optimal BIC and DIC mechanisms proposed in this paper for n-buyer 2-item auctions will be described using the formalism of hierarchy allocations. e concept of hierarchy allocation was rst raised in [2, 3] for one item, and later for multi-items in [4] . Here we only need the concept as a convenient language to succinctly present our mechanisms. Consider an n-buyer 1-item auction. A hierarchy allocation scheme H is speci ed by a mapping Rank : T → R ∪ {∞}. Given a type t ∈ (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ), scheme H allocates the item uniformly among the set of buyers i with the smallest ranking. If Rank(t i ) = ∞ for all i, then no allocation will be made to any buyer. For convenience, we use the notation H = [τ 11 , . . . , τ 1a 1 ; τ 21 , . . . , τ 2a 2 ; . . . ; τ 1 , . . . , τ a ] with the understanding Rank(τ dm ) = d for all 1 ≤ d ≤ , 1 ≤ m ≤ a d , and Rank(t) = ∞ for any type t not listed among τ dm .
In an n-buyer k-item auction, a hierarchy mechanism M uses a hierarchy allocation function speci ed by a k-tuple H = (H 1 , H 2 , · · · , H k ), where each H j is a hierarchy allocation scheme to be used for item j; also a utility function u i (t) for each buyer i needs to be speci ed for M. Note that the payment for buyer i is determined by
MAIN RESULTS
In this paper, we solve for REV D (F ) and REV B (F ) in the n-buyer, 2-item case when F consists of 2n IID's of a common F with support size 2. Any such F can be speci ed by a 4-tuple δ = (n, p, a, b) where n ≥ 2 is an integer, 0 < p < 1, and 0 ≤ a < b. Let F δ denote the valuation distribution for the n-buyer 2-item auction, where the distributions F j i for buyer i and item j are independent and identical (IID) copies of random variables X de ned by Pr {X = a} = p and Pr {X = b} = 1 − p. Assuming additive valuation on items for each buyer, we are interested in determining REV D (F δ ) and REV B (F δ ), the maximum revenue achievable under IR-DIC and BIR-BIC, respectively, for distribution F δ . We nd two benchmarks relevant, SREV (F δ ) and s b = 2(1 − p n )b: the former is the revenue obtained by selling separately each item using Myerson's optimal mechanism; the la er is the revenue by selling separately each item at price b.
It su ces to show that, for 1-item auction with n buyers and IID distributions F δ , the maximum revenue possible is equal to max{(1 − p n )b, p n−1 a + (1 − p n−1 )b}. According to Myerson's optimal auction theory, the revenue maximization problem in this se ing reduces to the welfare maximization problem where the valuation is replaced by a modi ed valuation (dependent on the distribution), called the ironed virtual valuation ϕ. It is easy to show that for the distribution
e maximum welfare achievable is given by
The Main Theorem
For any real-valued function G, we use G + to denote the nonnegative function de ned as G + = max{G, 0}. e functions r D (δ ) and r B (δ ) below will be used to express revenues. e formula for r D (δ ) can be interpreted as follows (and likewise for r B (δ )). e rst term 2(1 − p n )b is equal to s b . e three additive terms represent the extra revenue, beyond sellingseparately at b, that can be gleaned from three speci c subsets of pro les. ( ese subsets are de ned as S 0 , S 1 , S 2 in De nition 5 later, with non-zero probability of occurrence p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , respectively.) 
To compare r D (δ ) with SREV (F δ ) when b < 3 , notice that the two continuous piecewise-linear functions are equal when b = a and b = 3 . It is easy to check from their formulas that, r D (δ ) strictly dominates SREV (F δ ) at both breakpoints 1 
us for b = 2 we have REV D (F δ ) = 25/8 = 3.125 and REV B (F δ ) = 51/16 = 3.1875, with a gap of 2%. Note that grand bundling yields only revenue 45/16, while selling separately yields revenue 3, both strictly less than 3.125.
Open estions: It is an interesting open question to determine whether the 2% gap in Example 1 is the largest gap between DIC and BIC revenue for the family of distributions considered in our model. It would also be interesting to extend our results to more general models, say, where the two items have distinct IID distributions.
Optimal Mechanisms
e optimal revenue r D (δ ) and r B (δ ) stated in the Main eorem can be realized, respectively, by the IR-DIC mechanism M D,δ and the IR-BIC mechanism M B,δ de ned below. First, we name the characteristic functions for the three intervals where the individual terms of r D (δ ), r B (δ ) are non-zero. e subscripts in α p,a,b , γ p,a,b , β p,a,b can be dropped when p, a, b are clear from the context. Note that, if desired, the formulas for r D (δ ) and r B (δ ) can be wri en using α, β, γ as multipliers in place of the notation G + ≡ max{G, 0}.
De nition 3.4. De ne
         α p,a,b = 1 if b < 1 ,
De nition 3.5.
In what follows, the term pro le refers to a pro le in the support of F δ , a type refers to a type in {a, b} × {a, b}. For any pro le t and j ∈ {1, 2}, we say t j is cheap if t j i = a for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (we also say item j is cheap); otherwise t j is non-cheap. Call a pro le t 1-cheap if t has exactly 1 cheap item. We use I (t) to denote the subset of buyers i with t i (a, a) , that is, only excluding those who value both items at a. Note that, if t is 1-cheap, then |I (t)| is equal to the number of b's in t (and all appearing in the same column).
We now de ne mechanism M D,δ and M B,δ below, using the language of hierarchy mechanism. First divide the range (a, ∞) of b into 4 subintervals:
e payment of M(F δ ) is determined by the following utility function: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, t = (t i , t −i ),
Remark 3. Strictly speaking, M D,δ in Case 3 is not a hierarchy mechanism. We abuse the term slightly for convenience. Observe that, when b ∈ I 4 , M D,δ can be described as selling each item separately at price b with a particular tie-breaking rule as dictated by the Case 4 allocation function (H 1 , H 2 ). When b ∈ I 3 , M D,δ can be described as follows: if t = (t i , t −i ) with t −i = (a, a) n−1 , then o er items 1 and 2 to buyer i as a bundle at price a + b; otherwise sell each item separately at price b with a particular tie-breaking rule as dictated by the Case 3 allocation function (H 1 , H 2 ). In both Case 1 and 2, the payment is de ned by the same utility function u i (t i , t −i ) as in M D,δ with only one exception: if t i = (b, b) and t −i is 1-cheap, then let
is an IR-BIC mechanisms (not just BIR-BIC), as will be shown later.
Example 1 Revisited
As an illustration, let us apply mechanisms M D,δ and M B,δ to the distribution δ = (n, p, a, b) in Example 1 where n = 2, p = 1/2, a = 1 and b ∈ [2, 3). Since both mechanisms are designed to be fully symmetric with respect to the swapping of items 1 and 2, and to the swapping of buyers 1 and 2, we only need to specify enough details up to these symmetries. is δ falls under Case 3 of mechanism M D,δ and Case 2 of M B,δ , respectively. u 1 ((b, b), (1, b) ) ≥ u 1 ((1, b), (1, b) ) + (b − 1)q 1 1 ((1, b), (1, b) ).
Application to Continuous Distributions
e results in the Main eorem have implications on the maximum revenue for continuous distributions if the la er can be well approximated by F δ . As an application, let λ > 1, a > 1 λ−1 , and let
We can regard F δ , where δ = (n, p, 1, λ), as a normalized discrete approximation of F . C 3.6. Let δ = (n, p, 1, λ). ere exists a constant C δ such that
Corollary 3.6 is proved by an extension of our proof of the Main eorem to the continuous se ing (details omi ed here).
Remark 5. ere are general high-precision approximation theorems in the literature (e.g. see [6, 11, 20, 27] ) connecting continuous and discrete distributions for the BIC maximum revenue auction. Our derivation of Corollary 3.6 does not rely on such general theorems.
We consider an illustrative example of Corollary 3.6 where n = 2. Let G a = (F For a ≥ 20, the BIC maximum revenue for G a strictly exceeds its DIC maximum revenue. In fact, we have for a ≥ 6,
.
DIC MAXIMUM REVENUE
In this section we give a proof outline of the Main eorem for the dominant strategy implementation: We begin with a general discussion applicable to any mechanism. Let M be a mechanism with allocation q j i and utility u i . We separate out the allocation of cheap items from non-cheap items. us, de ne q j i (t) = q j i (t)η j (t) where η j (t) = 1 if item j is cheap, and η j (t) = 0 if j is non-cheap. Note that the welfare of the buyers from the allocation of cheap items is a · i, j,t Pr {t }q j i (t), while the welfare from the non-cheap items is i, j,t Pr {t }(1 − η j (t))q j i (t)t j i which is at most 2(1 − p n )b (the revenue obtained by selling-separately at price b). By de nition of utility, it is clear that the revenue M(F δ ) equals the total welfare minus utility of the buyers. is leads to the following formula: Basic Formula. For any mechanism M, we have
where Q = i, j,t Pr {t }q j i (t) and U = i,t Pr {t }u i (t).
De nition 4.3. For any set S of pro les, let Q(S) = t ∈S Pr {t } i, j q j i (t) and
To make use of the Basic Formula, we partition the pro les that can possibly contribute to the Q term into three subsets S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , and then use the IR-DIC Conditions to show that the U term (utility obtained by buyers) is greater than a certain linear combination of Q(S 0 ), Q(S 1 ), Q(S 2 ). e Basic Formula then yields r D (δ ) as an upper bound to M(F δ ).
De nition 4.4. Let S 0 = {(a, a) n } be the set containing a single element, namely, the lowest pro le. Let S 1 be the set of 1-cheap pro les t satisfying |I (t)| = 1. Let S 2 be the set of 1-cheap pro les t satisfying |I (t)| ≥ 2.
Recall that p 0 = p 2n , p 1 = 2np 2n−1 (1 −p), p 2 = 2p n (1 −p n −np n−1 (1 −p)). ey have the following interpretation as can be easily veri ed. Fact 3. Pr {t ∈ S } = p for ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where t is distributed according to F δ . L 4.5.
P . Any pro le in S 1 or S 2 has exactly one cheap item, and the (only) pro le in S 0 has two cheap items. Lemma 4.5 then follows from Fact 3.
P . It follows from Fact 2 that Q = Q(S 0 ) + Q(S 1 ) + Q(S 2 ). Lemma 4.6 then follows from the Basic Formula.
Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 set the stage. We are ready to invoke the incentive compatibility requirements to prove eorem 4.1. is se ing is also useful in the next section when we prove the BIC part of the Main eorem. 
Upper Bound to DIC Revenue
We prove eorem 4.1 in this subsection. e key is to prove the following proposition. Proposition 1. Any IR-DIC mechanism M must satisfy the following inequality:
We rst show that eorem 4.1 follows from Proposition 1. It follows from Lemma 4.6 and Proposition 1 that, for any IR-DIC mechanism M, we have
With no negative terms, the above expression together with Lemma 4.5 immediately yield eorem 4.1. us to establish eorem 4.1, it su ces to prove Proposition 1.
De nition 4.7. For any 1 ≤ i, i ≤ n, let τ i,i be the pro le t such that t 1 i = t 2 i = b and all other t j = a; let τ i,0 be the pro le t with t 1 i = b and all other t j = a; let τ 0,i be the pro le t with t 2 i = b and all other t j = a;
De nition 4.8. For any t ∈ S 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, de ne τ t,i as follows: let item j (j ∈ {1, 2}) be the cheap item for t; de ne τ t,i = t where t 
Fact 5. S 1 , S 2 are disjoint sets of pro les containing no cheap items.
From Fact 5 and the IR Conditions, we have
We now utilize the DIC-conditions to establish the following lemma relating the U and Q values on di erent types. L 4.10.
P . e DIC-conditions require that, for all t i , t i , t −i , and write DIC-Conditions: For all t i > t i and any t −i ,
To prove Eq. 6, consider t i ∈ {(b, a), (a, b)}, t i = (a, a). We have
By Fact 4 we have
Using Eq. 10 and the IR Conditions u i (t) ≥ 0, we obtain
is proves Eq. 6, the rst inequality in the Lemma. We now prove Eq. 7. Write
We prove Eq. 11 for x = L; the case for x = R is similar.
Now consider the DIC-Conditions (Eq. 9) for (t i , t −i ) = τ i,i and (t i , t −i ) = τ 0,i , which gives 
is proves Eq. 11, thus completing the proof of Eq. 7. We now prove Eq. 8, the third inequality of Lemma 4.10. By de nition
Now observe that the DIC-Condition Eq. 9 for τ t,i ∈ S 2 and t ∈ S 2 implies 2
From Eq. 14 and 15, we obtain
is proves Eq. 8. We have completed the proof of the Lemma 4.10.
Proposition 1 can be straightforwardly derived from Lemma 4.10, Eq. 5, and the IR conditions U (S 0 ), U (S 2 ) ≥ 0. is completes the proof of Proposition 1 and hence eorem 4.1.
Realizing DIC Revenue
We turn to the proof of eorem 4.2. We need to prove two statements. Eq. 2 is replaced by Q(S 0 ) = 2αp 0 , Q(S 1 ) = βp 1 , Q(S 2 ) = γp 2 . Combining these equalities gives us
. We now give the details. Fact 6. u i (t) = 0 for all t S 1 ∪ S 1 ∪ S 2 and all i. us,
Proof. From Eq. 1, we know that u i (t) 0 may occur only when t = (t i , t −i ) and one of the following is valid: (a) t −i = (a, a) n−1 and t i (a, a); (b) t −i is 1-cheap and t i = (b, b). In case (a) we have t ∈ S 1 ∪ S 1 , and in case (b) we have t ∈ S 2 . Fact 7.
Proof. For the (only) pro le t in S 0 , the allocation function of M D,δ speci es i, j q j i (t) = 2 if b < 1 , and 0 otherwise. Similarly, for any pro le t ∈ S 1 , i, j q j i (t) = 1 if b < 3 , and 0 otherwise; and for any pro le t ∈ S 2 , i, j q j i (t) = 1 if b < 2 , and 0 otherwise. is is exactly the assertion of Fact 7.
P . Follows immediately from Fact 3 and 7.
As under M D,δ all the non-cheap items are allocated in full, the Basic Formula achieves equality, i.e. M D,δ (F δ ) = 2(1 − p n )b + Qa − U . Also from Fact 2 we have Q = Q(S 0 ) + Q(S 1 ) + Q(S 2 ), and from Fact 6 we have U = U (S 1 ) + U (S 1 ) + U (S 2 ). Lemma 4.12 follows. L 4.13.
P . Eq. 18 can easily be derived from Eq. 1, Lemma 4.11, and Fact 3. We omit the proof here. To prove Eq. 19, note that for any τ i,i ∈ S 1 , Eq. 1 implies i u i (τ i,i ) = ( α n + β)(b − a) if i = i , and 0 otherwise. us we have
Making use of Lemma 4.11 and Fact 3, we obtain Eq. 19. To prove Eq. 20, note that for any t ∈ S 2 , 1 ≤ i, i ≤ n we have from Eq. 1
It follows that
Pr {t }
where we used Lemma 4.11 and Fact 3 in the last step. is proves Eq. 20. We have nished the proof of Lemma 4.13.
Using Lemmas 4.11-4.13 and simplifying the above equation, we obtain
is proves Statement 2, and completes the proof of eorem 4.2.
BIC MAXIMUM REVENUE
In this section we give a proof of the Main eorem for the Bayesian implementation:
e proofs of eorem 5.1 and 5.2 follow the same top-level outline as the proofs of eorem 4.1 and 4.2. Lemma 4.5 and 4.6 proved in Section 4 are valid for any mechanism M, and will also be the starting point for the BIC proof.
Upper Bound to BIC Revenue
We prove eorem 5.1 in this subsection. e key is to prove the following proposition. Proposition 2. Any BIR-BIC mechanism M must satisfy the following inequality:
eorem 5.1 can be derived from Lemma 4.5, 4.6 and Proposition 2 in exactly the same way as eorem 4.1's derivation from Lemma 4.5, 4.6 and Proposition 1, and will not be repeated here. It remains to prove Proposition 2.
We use a subset of the BIR-BIC Conditions in our proof; these conditions are listed below for easy reference. 
e plan is to use Eqs. 23-27 to obtain a lower bound on U in terms of Q(S 0 ), Q(S 1 ) and Q(S 2 ).
P . Adding up Eqs. 26 and 27, we obtain
where we have used the fact that q Pr {t } 
U (S 1 ) = (b − a) 1 2
e proof of Eqs. 33-34 is exactly the same as in the proof of Eqs. 18-19 in Lemma 4.13. e proof of Eq. 35 is also similar to the proof of Eq. 20 in Lemma 4.13. We omit the details here. Use Lemmas 5.5-5.7 and simplify, we obtain M B,δ (F δ ) = r B (δ ).
is proves Statement 4, and completes the proof of eorem 5.2.
